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FOUR OBSERVATIONS ABOUT HATE SPEECH
Richard Delgado*
Jean Stefancic**

INTRODUCTION

In August 2008, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed the
conviction of a motorist who engaged in a shouting match with two
women, one white, the other black, on a public highway.' The
automobile in which the two women were riding sported a rainbow
decal on the rear bumper, which prompted the defendant, who was
named Johnson, to believe that the two were lesbians.2 After
Johnson found himself stuck in traffic behind the women's car when
the roadway narrowed from two lanes to one, he began tailgating
the other car, making obscene gestures, and shouting racial epithets
through a makeshift sound amplification system.3
Johnson's conduct continued for about five minutes as the
vehicles made their way through stop-and-go traffic. Although he
did not threaten the women, they feared that he was trying to start
an altercation that might easily become violent. One of the women4
testified that she saw a second person in the bed of the other vehicle
swinging a skateboard menacingly.
The prosecutor charged Johnson under a statute that
criminalized "publicly insulting [another] person by abusive words
or gestures in a manner intended and likely to provoke a violent
response."6 The defendant demurred to the indictment on freespeech grounds.7 After the trial judge overruled the demurrer, the
* University Professor, Seattle University School of Law; J.D., 1974,
University of California, Berkeley.
** Research Professor, Seattle University School of Law; M.A., 1989,
University of San Francisco.
1. State v. Johnson, 191 P.3d 665, 666 (Or. 2008) (en banc).
2. Id. Such a decal expresses solidarity with gays and lesbians.
3. Id. The opinion does not explain how Mr. Johnson came to have a
bullhorn or similar device in his vehicle.
4. Johnson's vehicle appears to have been a pickup truck, in whose bed at
least one passenger was riding. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 667 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 166.065.1(a)(B) (2007) (criminalizing
abusive speech)).
7. Id.
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case proceeded to trial. At its conclusion, Johnson appealed his
conviction on a number of grounds, including that his speech fell
under Oregon's free-speech guarantee, which is similar to the First
Amendment. The state supreme court agreed, finding that Oregon's
statute unconstitutionally singled out a form of words 8 irrespective
of whether they resulted in a physical act or fear of imminent
violence. The statute thus targeted a broad category of speech, some
of which is entitled to constitutional protection.9
The court conceded that annoyance is a common reaction to
words that a listener finds "unpleasant." ° But a state may not
punish speakers of those words for that reason alone. Mild distress
such as that which the two women experienced might well warrant
a civil remedy, but not a criminal sanction. 1
State v.Johnson is typical of a number of cases that pit the
interests of hate speakers against those of their targets or
audiences. 2 Some such cases arise in criminal settings, such as
Johnson, or ones in which an individual burns a cross in an
intimidating fashion. 13 Others arise when a college or university
charges a student or visitor with violating a campus regulation
forbidding the dissemination of some form of hatred." Unlike in the
criminal arena, where the law enforcement side generally prevails,' 5
these cases usually result in victory for the free-speech side.
Nevertheless, campuses have continued enacting new versions of
hate-speech regulations, in search of one that will survive scrutiny.' 6
8. Namely, words of harassment.
9. Johnson, 191 P.3d at 668-69

(declaring

Oregon's

statute

unconstitutionally broad).

10. Id.
11. Id. at 669 n.5.
12. For a sampling of the case law in this area, see, for example, RICHARD
DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND

[hereinafter

DELGADO &

STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING

(2004)

WORDS THAT WOUND]

(discussing legal decisions and statutes in a variety of areas including torts, the

Internet, pornography, and children's rights).
13. See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003) (upholding a Virginia
statute that banned cross burning with the intent to intimidate a person or
group); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down a St. Paul
ordinance that punished cross burning with the aim of provoking violence on
the basis of race, color, and a few other characteristics).
14. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Campus Antiracism Rules: Constitutional
Narratives in Collision, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 343, 355-58 (1991) [hereinafter
Delgado, Narrativesin Collision] (analyzing these and similar cases).

15. Johnson, for now at least, is an exception, although it may turn out to
be a bellwether. Some free-speech advocates are working to narrow harassment
law on the ground that expression should be as free as possible. See Kenneth L.
Marcus, Higher Education, Harassment, and First Amendment Opportunism,

16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1025, 1045-47 (2008).
16. See generally JON B. GOULD, SPEAK No EVIL: THE TRIUMPH OF HATE
SPEECH REGULATION (2005) (examining the history of university hate speech

regulation and concluding that administrators appear determined to enact
speech codes that will promote a healthy climate on campus).
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Other cases featuring the same conflict between constitutional
values" arise when women complain of sexual harassment at work. 8
In all these cases, judges and commentators are prone to frame the
issue in free speech rather than equal protection terms. 19 This may
be because the speaker receives backing from an organization like
the ACLU or FIRE (Foundation for Individual Rights in Education)
dedicated to advancing the former value. Or it may be because
courts value positive rights, such as the right to speak one's mind,
more highly than they do negative ones, such as the right to be free
from aggressive vituperation. 2 0 Finally, it may be, as some have
noted, because free-speech rights tend to favor the interests of
powerful groups such as magazine owners, newspaper editors, and
purveyors of pornography, while those clamoring for greater
restrictions are women, racial minorities, and university
administrators with fewer resources and prestige than their
counterparts on the First Amendment side.2 '
Regardless of the reason, these controversies pitting free speech
against equality raise a number of questions, some of which we have
addressed in previous writings and others that we would like to
address now. We summarize our previous writing below to simplify
discussion, avoid undue repetition, and facilitate cross-referencing.22
17. We mean the conflict between free-speech values and equal protection
or racial peace.
18.

See generally

CATHARINE

A.

MACKINNON,

ONLY

WORDS

(1993)

(discussing the controversy over regulating pornography, sexual harassment,
and hate speech).
19. That is, they begin by asking "Is this speech protected?" rather than
"Should this campus's interest in racial peace receive protection?"
20. Interview with Alexander Tsesis, Professor of Law, Loyola Univ.-Chi.
Sch. of Law, in Seattle, Wash. (Sept. 25, 2008) (pointing out the disparity in the
extent of protection courts afford the two types of rights); see also Peter
Schmidt, Group Tells Public-College Presidents They May Be Personally Liable
for Speech Code, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Wash., D.C.), Jan. 5, 2009,

http://chronicle.com/daily/2009/01/9630n.htm (online edition) (explaining FIRE's
position).
21. See Am. Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985)
(invalidating ordinance written by Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin
that drew the ire of the pornography industry); see also MACKINNON, supra note
18, at 53 (noting the alliance between the ACLU and the pornography
industry);

Richard Delgado, Toward a Legal Realist View of the First

Amendment, 113 HARv. L. REV. 778, 789-91 (2000) (reviewing
SHRIFFRIN,

DISSENT,

INJUSTICE,

AND

THE

MEANINGS

OF

STEVEN

AMERICA

H.

(1999))

[hereinafter Delgado, Legal Realist View] (noting how hate speech may
contribute to the creation of a class system).
22. RICHARD DELGADO & JEAN STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAzis?: HATE
SPEECH, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE NEW FIRST AMENDMENT (1997) [hereinafter
DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?] (reviewing case law and
scholarship in this area and arguing that a new First Amendment
jurisprudence is emerging); DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS
THAT WOUND, supra note 12; MARI MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND:
CRITICAL RACE THEORY,ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993)
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The new issues" are the following: (1) strategy and use of
resources within the progressive camp,24 (2) the costs of a freespeech regime versus one that puts antiracism first, 25 (3) interest
balancing, and (4) a tendency to frame the issue as one of
procedure rather than substance.
Although these issues arise in each of the settings mentioned
above,'2 8 we take campus hate-speech regulation as our principal
(compiling leading essays on hate-speech reform); THE PRICE WE PAY: THE CASE
AGAINST RACIST SPEECH, HATE PROPAGANDA, AND PORNOGRAPHY (Laura J.
Lederer & Richard Delgado eds., 1995); Richard Delgado, Narratives in
Collision, supra note 14; Richard Delgado, First Amendment Formalism Is
Giving Way to FirstAmendment Legal Realism, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 169
(1994) [hereinafter Delgado, Formalism Is Giving Way] (discussing changes in
free speech legal methodology); Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort
Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 133 (1982) [hereinafter Delgado, Words That Wound] (urging tort remedies
for racial slurs and insults); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Hateful Speech,
Loving Communities: Why Our Notion of "A Just Balance" Changes So Slowly,
82 CAL. L. REV. 851 (1994) (analyzing the difficulties that lie in the way of
judges considering a change in a reigning paradigm); Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and Culture: Can Free
Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1258 (1992)
[hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider] (discussing social
stereotypes of various minority groups and the role of hate speech in inscribing
them); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Pornographyand Harm to Women:
"No Empirical Evidence?," 53 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado &
Stefancic, Pornography and Harm to Women] (discussing factual basis for
regulating pornography industry); Richard Delgado & David H. Yun, Pressure
Valves and Bloodied Chickens: An Analysis of PaternalisticObjections to HateSpeech Regulation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 871 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Yun,
Pressure Valves] (discussing liberal objections to hate-speech controls); Richard
Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech
Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter,and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND.
L. REV. 1807 (1994) [hereinafter Delgado & Yun, Toughlovel (analyzing a series
of conservative objections to hate-speech regulation); Richard Delgado & David
Yun, "The Speech We Hate": FirstAmendment Totalism, the ACLU, and the
Principle of Dialogic Politics, 27 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1281 (1995) [hereinafter Delgado
& Yun, Speech We Hate] (evaluating an absolutist objection to regulating hate
speech); Delgado, Legal Realist View, supra note 21; Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic, Apologize and Move On?: Finding a Remedy for Pornography,Insult,
and Hate Speech, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 93 (1996) (reviewing RICHARD ABEL,
SPEECH AND RESPECT (1994), a book on apologies as remedies for racial harms,
including hate speech); Jean Stefancic & Richard Delgado, A Shifting Balance:
Freedom of Expression and Hate-Speech Restriction, 78 IOWA L. REV. 737 (1993)
(book review) [hereinafter Stefancic & Delgado, A Shifting Balance] (reviewing
a book on international hate-speech controls).
23. By "new" we mean in the sense that we have not previously addressed
the matter, or else in the sense that we have not delved into it as deeply as we
need to here.
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part II.
26. See infra Part HI.
27. See infra Part IV.
28. That is, campus codes, workplace harassment, and prosecution for hate
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example because it presents in pristine form many of the questions
that interest us. As will be seen, the first and fourth issues have to
do with the structure of the debate; the second and third deal with
neglected elements in the calculus of the two sides.
I.

OBSERVATION NUMBER ONE: THE OPPORTUNITY COST
OF AN IN-GROUP FEUD

Our first observation concerns not so much the merits of the two
positions as the nature of the pitched battle that is taking place.
Each of the controversies mentioned earlier2 9 features a progressive
organization trying to impose its view on another of the same or
very similar stripe. With hate speech, for example, the ACLU,
FIRE, and other progressive organizations clash with campus
authorities and activists of color over the legitimacy of controlling
that form of expression. In the simplest terms, First Amendment
defenders maintain that campus speech should be free, while their
30
adversaries insist that the campus should be free-but of racism.
Their dispute features contrasting views about how to frame the
central issue, the governing narrative, controlling case law, and the
lessons of history. 1
As we have noted, free-speech defenders invoke case law such
as Brandenburgv. Ohio3 2 and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan33 that
has decisively expanded the scope of free speech. These advocates
invoke a particular kind of story, or narrative, as well. For them,
defense of campus speech is part of a history that includes the
struggle of Western society to rise above superstition and enforced
orthodoxy.34 They cite heroes, such as Socrates, Galileo, and Peter
Zenger, who put their bodies on the line to expand free expression,
and writers such as John Locke, David Hume, Thomas Hobbes, and
Voltaire, who placed it on a firm theoretical foundation. 35
The equality faction approaches the problem from a different
perspective. For them, defending racial and sexual minorities from
hateful invective is an essential feature of safeguarding equal
crimes.
29. That is, campus hate speech, racial harassment in the workplace, and
enforcement of criminal laws punishing harassment or ethnic intimidation. See
supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 14, at 345-48
(explaining these two polar positions); Delgado, Legal Realist View, supra note
21, at 793-95, 800-01 (same).
31. E.g., Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 14, at 345-48. We
explain and illustrate these differences immediately infra.
32. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam) (offering a ringing defense of
unfettered free speech).
33. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (applying a high standard for defamation of a
public figure).
34. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAzIs?, supra note 22, at

46-49 (discussing the opposing narratives).
35. Id. at 48.
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protection and equal dignity or, in the case of university
administrators, a healthy environment for learning." This group,
too, has its favorite cases, but they are ones like Brown v. Board of
Education37 that emphasize the role of equality in education and
other areas of life. 8 Like their counterparts on the other side, they
invoke stories that lie close to America's core, including those of civil
rights heroes like Medgar Evers, Rosa Parks, and Cesar Chavez,
who fought to expand the rights of all citizens.39 They call upon
different theorists, including Charles Lawrence4" and Catharine
MacKinnon, 41 who propose frameworks for limiting hateful
expression. They cite the example of many Western democracies
that have done just that.42
We mention the above not to highlight the indeterminacy of the
debate or the way in which one can cite constitutional values on
either side. We have done this elsewhere43 and believe that the
party of multiculturalism has the better argument.
Instead, we
mention it to point out a feature that ought to have been obvious all
along, but that we and most other commentators seem to have
missed-namely, how the debate proceeds almost entirely between
two groups of the progressive left: the ACLU and its followers, on
the one hand, and minority groups, critical race theorists, and their
allies on the other.45
36. See id. at 47-49 (discussing the equality-first position); Delgado,
Formalism Is Giving Way, supra note 22 (same).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (invalidating separate but equal school
assignments for black and white children).
38. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAzIs?, supra note 22, at 48.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431 (defending restrictions on hate
speech as necessary to safeguard the right of equal education); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987) (demonstrating the influence
of unconscious racism and urging that antidiscrimination law expand to take it
into account).
41. See MACKINNON, supra note 18 (defending limitations on pornography
and racial harassment).
42. See, e.g., Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 14, at 362-71
(reviewing international responses to racial speech); Stefancic & Delgado, A
Shifting Balance, supranote 22, at 739-41 (same).
43. E.g., Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 14, at 345-48
(discussing competing frameworks for analyzing hate-speech regulation).
44. See MATSUDA ET AL., supra note 22 (offering an extended argument for
regulating hate speech); Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 14 (same);
Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 22 (questioning a number of
standard arguments against hate-speech regulation); Delgado & Yun, Speech
We Hate, supra note 22 (same).
45. See infra notes 46-54 and accompanying text for examples. We are not
saying that every member or chapter of the ACLU opposes hate-speech controls,
or that every person or organization of color supports them. See Delgado &
Yun, Toughlove, supra note 22, at 1812-13 (noting that some of the latter do not
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The struggle, in short, proceeds between two sets of progressive
activists46 who, in most respects, see the world in very similar terms,
consuming attention and energy at the very time when the political
right-which holds little affection for either of them-has been
registering large gains.47 For example, while the ACLU has been
laboring to convince minorities of the error of their ways,
conservative power has been rolling back the right of privacy by
opening citizens' library records to official prying and insisting on
the right to snoop on e-mail and telephone exchanges. 8 At the same
time, conservatives in government have carved out a broad sphere of
governmental secrecy, greatly limiting the public's access to
information. 49 These are, of course, areas close to a civil libertarian's
heart.
By the same token, scholars like those writing for this
symposium have been trying to convince the free-speech advocates
of the error of their ways, while conservative judges and
administrators have been steadily dismantling programs that lie
close to the heart of civil rights advocates, including affirmative
support such controls).
46. Namely, the ACLU and similar organizations, who in other respects
support progressive causes, and, on the other hand, schools such as critical race
theory, which counts a number of prominent anti-hate-speech scholars,
including Mari Matsuda, Charles Lawrence, and Richard Delgado, among its
members.
47. We list some of these gains immediately infra. On the rise of
conservative movements in such areas as immigration reform, English-Only,
and welfare, see MANUEL GONZALES & RICHARD DELGADO, THE POLITICS OF FEAR:
How REPUBLICANS USE MONEY, RACE, AND THE MEDIA TO WIN (2006); JEAN
STEFANCIC & RIcHARD DELGADO, No MERCY: How CONSERVATIVE THINK TANKS

AND FOUNDATIONS CHANGED AMERICA'S SOCIAL AGENDA (1996); Paul Krugman,

Op-Ed., It's a Different Country, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2008, at A21.
48. E.g., Neil A. Lewis, Ashcroft Permits F.B.I. to Monitor Internet and
Public Activities, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2002, at A20; Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft
Mocks Librariansand Others Who Oppose Partsof CounterterrorismLaw, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 16, 2003, at A23; Michael Moss & Ford Fessenden, New Tools for
Domestic Spying, and Qualms, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2002, at Al; see also Adam
Liptak, Little Help from Justices on Spy Program,N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at
A21; Julia Preston, Judge Strikes Down Section of PatriotAct Allowing Secret
Subpoenas of Internet Data, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2004, at A26 (detailing areas
in which a conservative administration has asserted the power to invade
citizens' privacy); James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers
Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al; Kathleen Taylor, It's Time to
Begin Restoring Lost Liberties, SEATLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 26, 2009, at
B9.
49. On the Bush administration's penchant for official secrecy, see, for
example, Felicity Barringer, White House Refused to Open E-Mail on Pollutants,
N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at A15; Leonard Pitts, Op-Ed., Mourning a Country
Long Gone, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct. 19, 2008, at B10; Scott Shane, Invoking Secrets
Privilege Becomes a More Popular Legal Tactic by U.S., N.Y. TIMES, June 4,
2006, at A32; see also Geoffrey Stone, Op-Ed., How to Put Civil Liberties in the
White House, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2008, at A19 (noting recent retrenchment in
civil liberties and proposing a cabinet-level position for their protection).
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action, ° bilingual education,5 1 and the rights of immigrants. 52 These
same conservative judges and administrators have also been
weakening courts' abilities to redress racial discrimination through
judicially created intent requirements, strict chains of causation,
and limitations on who may sue and when.53
Two groups of moderate leftists have thus been energetically
clashing while conservatives have been making steady inroads into
programs both sets of leftists hold dear. This reality suggests that
moderate leftists might wish to find some common ground and turn
their attention to what their adversaries have been achieving at
their expense. One could analogize the situation to one in which two
dogs, one slightly larger than the other, are carrying on a ferocious
snarl-fest in the middle of the street, feinting and lunging, making a
tremendous racket, blissfully unaware that the dog catchers are
coming to take them to the municipal shelter where they will be
euthanized ten days later.54
It is possible that with a new administration, the conservative
assault on civil liberties and civil rights will ease somewhat. But
historical forces such as the war on terror 55 and the new color-blind
approach to race relations56 are likely to generate continuing
pressure on the progressive agenda regardless of who is in power in
Washington. The hate-speech adversaries (and we do not exclude
50. See, e.g., Robert Pear, In California, Voters Bar Preferences Based on

Race, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 1996, at B7 (noting the passage of an initiative
banning use of race in public programs, including higher education).
51. See

RICHARD DELGADO ET AL., LATINOS AND THE LAw

250-68 (2008)

(discussing recent attacks on bilingual education).
52. Id. at 406-500.
53. E.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-07 (1989)
(requiring narrow tailoring and rejecting evidence of society-wide
discrimination in such suits); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976)
(requiring proof of intent in cases alleging racial discrimination).
54. To the dogs in this example, the dispute at the time may seem terribly
important. It is only by expanding their frame of reference that the animals'
common jeopardy comes into view.
55. The war on terror has increased suspicion and profiling of minorities,
especially those who look Middle Eastern. See, e.g., HEIDI BEIRICH ET AL., S.
POVERTY L. CTR., THE NATIVISTS: PROFILES OF 20 ANTI-IMMIGRANT LEADERS
(2008), http://www.splcenter.org/intel/intelreportarticle.jsp?aid=885 (discussing
an increase in scrutiny of foreign-looking people); Damien Cave, Local Officials
Adopt New, Harder Tactics on Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2008, at
Al; Jeff Stein, CollateralDamage:After 9/11, the Justice Department Rounded
Up Thousands of Innocent People, N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 2008, at 9 (reviewing

ERIC

LICHTBLAU, BUSH'S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008) and
discussing abridgments of civil liberties in the wake of September 11, 2001).
56. For discussion of the view that the U.S. is a color-blind society, see, for
example, MICHAEL K. BROWN ET AL., WHITEWASHING RACE: THE MYTH OF A
COLOR-BLIND SOCIETY (2003).
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ourselves) need to ponder the expenditure of energy that they have
been making and whether a d6tente of some sort is in order.5 7
II.

OBSERVATION NUMBER TWO: THE EVALUATION OF HARMS
HAS BEEN INCOMPLETE

One way, of course, to end the current standoff is for one of the
parties to defer to the other's point of view. Indeed, by pursuing an
aggressive campaign of litigation, the free-speech camp has been
implicitly urging that the other side do just that." One could also
argue that a host of campus administrators, by enacting successive
versions of hate-speech codes, are attempting to do the same thing,
namely, wear the other side down.59 Ordinarily, though, it is the
free-speech faction, with a string of lower-court victories to its
credit, who urge the other side to "get over it" and toughen its
collective hide.6" Yet, a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of
speech regulation suggests that the case for it is closer than the
ACLU and some courts seem ready to acknowledge.
Before addressing the costs of hate-speech regulation versus the
opposite, it is advisable to arrive at an understanding of what hate
speech is.
A

Types of Hate Speech

Hate speech, including the campus variety, can take a number
of forms-direct (sometimes called "specific") or indirect; veiled or
overt; single or repeated; backed by power, authority, or threat, or
not.6 ' One can also distinguish it in terms of the characteristicsuch as race, religion, sexual orientation, immigration status, or
gender-of the person or group it targets.62 It can isolate a single
57. That is, the parties-the First Amendment defenders, who are
generally liberal (or libertarian), and the advocates of hate-speech regulation,
who are, as well-might agree to expend less energy combating each other and
instead join forces to counter the conservative onslaught against programs that
both prize.
58. Two of the better known cases are UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents,
774 F. Supp. 1163, 1164, 1181 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (striking down a campus antihate-speech code at the University of Wisconsin) and Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 853-54 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (doing the same at the
University of Michigan).
59. See supra note 16 and accompanying text (noting that colleges and
universities persist in enacting new hate-speech codes even though they realize
they will attract legal challenges).
60. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 58.
61. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra
note 12, at 11-12; Delgado, Legal Realist View, supra note 21, at 786.
62.

DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra

note 12, at 11-12.
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individual ("Jones, you goddamned X.") or group ("The goddamned
Xs are destroying this country."). It can be delivered orally, in
writing, on the Internet, or in the form of a tangible thing, such as a
Confederate flag, football mascot, or monument.
It can be
anonymous, as with graffiti or a leaflet surreptitiously placed on a
bulletin board or under a dormitory door, or its author can be
plainly identified.' The object of the speech may be free to leave, or
trapped, as in a classroom or workplace. 6
B.

The Harms of Hate Speech
The various forms of hate speech present different kinds and
degrees of harm.
The face-to-face kind is the most immediately problematic,
especially if the target is not in a position to leave and the one
delivering it possesses the power to harm.
1.

Director Face-to-FaceHate Speech

Although some courts and commentators describe the injury of
hate speech as mere offense, 6 the harm associated with the face-toface kind, at least, is often far greater than that and includes
flinching, tightening of muscles, adrenaline rushes, and inability to
sleep. 7 Some victims may suffer psychosocial harms, including
depression, repressed anger, diminished self-concept, and
impairment of work or school performance. 6 Some may take refuge
in drugs, alcohol, or other forms of addiction, compounding their
misery.69
63. Id. at 11-12, 123-51.
64. Id. at 11-12; Delgado, Legal Realist View, supra note 21, at 786.
65. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra

note 12, at 11 (giving the example of a teacher addressing a student); Delgado,
Legal Realist View, supra note 21, at 786; see also Delgado & Stefancic, Images
of the Outsider, supra note 22, at 1281-82, 1285 (noting the role of power and
authority in the creation of racial stereotypes); Delgado, Legal Realist View,
supra note 21, at 789-90, 793-95 (same).
66. See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685, 694 (N.J. 1998) (deeming
racial insults not comparable to ordinary ones because they conjure up and
reinforce the entire history of racial discrimination in this country); supra note
10 and accompanying text.
67.

DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND,

supra

note 12, at 13-14 (listing these and other physical consequences of a racial
insult); Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 22, at 137-39, 146 (noting
similar consequences in support of a tort remedy for racist speech).
68. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra
note 12, at 14-16; see Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 22, at 135-36,
139-41.
69.

DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WoRDs THAT WOUND,

supra
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2. Hate Speech and Children
With children, the harms of hate speech may be even more
worrisome. A child victimized by racial taunts or browbeating may
respond aggressively, with the result that he or she is labeled as
assaultive.' Or, the child can respond by internalizing the harm
and pretending to ignore it. Robbed of self-confidence and a sense of
ease, such a child can easily become introspective and morose.7 If
the child's parents suffer the same fate at work, they may bring
these problems home so that the parents retain even less energy for
their families than before. 7' Recent scholarship points out how the
pathologies associated with social subordination may be
transgenerational, lasting for centuries, if not millennia, and include
pain, fear, shame, anger, and despair.3
3.

General Hate Speech

With general hate speech, such as anonymously circulated
flyers or speeches to a crowd, the harms, while diffuse, may be just
as serious.
Recent scholarship shows how practically every instance of
genocide came on the heels of a wave of hate speech depicting the
victims in belittling terms." For example, before launching their
wave of deadly attacks on the Tutsis in Rwanda, Hutus in
government and the media disseminated a drumbeat of messages
casting their ethnic rivals as despicable.76 The Third Reich did much
the same with the Jews during the period leading up to the
Holocaust.77
note 12, at 14 (citing studies).
70. See id. at 15, 93-105.
71. Id.; see also Delgado, Words that Wound, supra note 22, at 142-43, 146.
72. DELGADO & STEFANCIC, UNDERSTANDING WORDS THAT WOUND, supra
note 12, at 15.
73. See Jonathan R. Cohen, Coping with Lasting Social Injustice, 13 WASH.
& LEE J. Civ. RTs. & Soc. JUST. 259, 268-81 (2007).
74. By diffuse, we mean harms that afflict a substantial group, not just a
single individual. As we show, these harms are qualitatively different from the
ones (such as elevated blood pressure, internalized anger, and depression)
associated with face-to-face insults. For example, their onset is delayed and
mediated by other factors, such as the extent to which the demonized group is
able to flee.
75. See, e.g., ALEXANDER TSESIS, DESTRUCTIVE MESSAGES: How HATE SPEECH
PAVES THE WAY FOR HARMFUL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 9-79 (2002) (reviewing
examples); id. at 82, 113, 137-39, 193 (tracing the causal connection between
hate speech and deadly policies).
76. See, e.g., W. Bradley Wendel, The Banality of Evil and the First
Amendment, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1404, 1404-05 (2004) (reviewing TSESIS, supra
note 75).
77. See TSESIS, supra note 75, at 9-79 (discussing the Holocaust, slavery,
and Indian removal).
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When the United States enslaved African Americans and killed
or removed the Indians, it rationalized that these were simple folk
who needed discipline and tutelage, or else bloodthirsty savages who
resisted the blessings of civilization.
When, a little later, the
nation marched westward in pursuit of manifest destiny, it justified
taking over the rich lands of California and the Southwest on the
ground that the indolent Mexicans living on them did not deserve
their good fortune.7 ' Before interning the Japanese during World
War II, propagandists depicted the group as sneaky, suspicious, and
despotic. °
It is possible that the connection between general hate speech
and instances of mass oppression may not be merely statistical and
contingent, but conceptual and necessary."
Concerted action
requires an intelligible intention or rationale capable of being
understood by others. One cannot mistreat another group without
first articulating a reason why one is doing it--otherwise, no one but
82
a sadist would join in.
Without a softening-up period, early steps toward genocide,
such as removing Jews to a ghetto, would strike others as gratuitous
and command little support. Discriminatory action of any kind
presupposes a group that labors under a stigma of some kind.' The
prime mechanism for the creation of such stigma is hate speech.r8
Without it, genocide, imperialism, Indian removal, and Jim Crow
could gain little purchase. 85
C.

The Harms of Speech Regulation
If the harms of hate speech are sobering, what lies on the other

78. See id. at 49-65 (discussing Indian removal); Delgado & Stefancic,
Images of the Outsider, supra note 22, at 1260-75 (discussing stereotypes of
four minority groups in the United States, including Native Americans, and the
role of these stereotypes in justifying oppression).
79. See, e.g., JuAN F. PEREA ET AL., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES
FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA 288-96 (2d ed. 2007) (discussing historian Reginald
Horsman's thesis regarding the origin of the Anglo-Saxon).
80. See id. at 436-62; Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider, supra

note 22, at 1272.
81. By conceptual and necessary, we mean implied in the very meaning of
the term-for example, linked by the nature of mass extermination, not merely
frequently found in conjunction with it.
82. Imagine that a secretary of agriculture proposes cutting down all the
daisies in a field. One would immediately want to know why. Do daisies choke
off other more desirable plants? Cause hay fever among the allergy-prone?
Interfere with the breeding habits of migratory birds?
83. See TSESIS, supra note 75, at 9 (suggesting a connection between hate
speech and historic atrocities).
84. See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NoTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
SPOILED IDENTITY (1963) (discussing how society constructs stigma of various
kinds); TSESIS, supra note 75 (same).

85. Without a widely announced campaign of demonization, no one would
know whom to kill or why to do it.
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side? What happens to the hate speaker forced to hold things in?
Will he or she suffer psychological injury, depression, nightmares,
drug addiction, and a blunted self image? 6 Diminished pecuniary
and personal prospects? 8 7 Will hate-speech regulation set up the
speaker's group for extermination, seizure of ancestral lands, or
anything comparable?8'
The very possibility seems far-fetched. And, indeed, regimes,
such as Europe's and Canada's, that criminalize hate speech exhibit
none of these ills. 89

Speech and inquiry there seem as free and

uninhibited as in the United States, and their press just as feisty as
our own.90
What about harm to the hate speaker? The individual who
holds his or her tongue for fear of official sanction may be
momentarily irritated. But "bottling it up" seems not to inflict
serious psychological or emotional damage. 9' Early in the debate
about hate speech, some posited that a prejudiced individual forced
to keep his impulses in check might become more dangerous as a
result.

2

By analogy to a pressure valve, he or she might explode in

a more serious form of hate speech or even a physical attack on a
member of the target group. 93 But studies examining this possibility
discount it. 94 Indeed, the bigot who expresses his sentiment aloud is

apt to be more dangerous, not less, as a result. The incident "revs
him up" for the next one, while giving onlookers the impression that
baiting minorities is socially acceptable, so that they may follow
suit.95 A recently developed social science instrument, the Implicit

86. These are among the harms of racist hate speech. See supra notes 6773 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 68, 71-73 and accompanying text (noting that these are
common results of hate speech).
88. See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text (noting that hate speech
often precedes waves of mass cruelty).
89. See Stefancic & Delgado, A Shifting Balance, supra note 22 (reviewing
hate-speech controls in a number of foreign countries).
90. See Delgado, Narratives in Collision, supra note 14, at 361-71.
91. Might learning self-control be a step toward developing moral
character? See

DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAzIs?, supra note

22,

at 63 (suggesting that uttering hate speech impairs personal growth by
"encouraging rigid, dichotomous thinking and impeding moral development");
see also Delgado, Words That Wound, supra note 22, at 140 (positing that
learning to suppress impulses toward bigotry might be a step toward developing
moral character).
Aristotle believed that moral character required the
development of good habits, or dispositions, to do good and refrain from evil.
Upbraiding others needlessly would certainly qualify as a case of the latter.
92. See, e.g., Delgado & Yun, Pressure Valves, supra note 22 (casting doubt
on the "pressure valve" argument for unbridled hate speech).
93. Id. at 877-78.
94. Id. at 878-80.
95. Id.; see also Editorial, Politics of Attack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at
A30 (discussing angry rhetoric at rally for vice presidential candidate Sarah
Palin that included the cry "kill him!").
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Association Test ("IAT"), shows that many Americans harbor
measurable animus toward racial minorities. 6 Might it be that
hearing hate speech, in person or on the radio, contributes to that
result?"
III.

OBSERVATION NUMBER THREE: INTEREST BALANCING MUST
TAKE ACCOUNT OF RELEVANT FEATURES OF HATE SPEECH

If all types of hate speech are apt to impose costs," large or
small, how should courts and policymakers weigh them?
Not every victim of hate speech will respond in one of the ways
described above. Some will shrug it off or lash back at the
aggressor, giving as good as they got. 99 The harm of hate speech is
variable, changing from victim to victim and setting to setting.' By
the same token, it is impossible to say with assurance that the cost
of hate-speech regulation will always be negligible. Some speakers
who might wish to address sensitive topics, such as affirmative
action or racial differences in response to medical treatments, might
shy away from them.'
The interplay of voices that society relies on
to regulate itself may deteriorate. In balancing hate speech versus
regulation, two benchmarks may be helpful: a review of current freespeech "exceptions" and attention to the role of incessancy.
CurrentFree-Speech Exceptions
Not all speech is free. The current legal landscape contains
many exceptions and special doctrines corresponding to speech that
society has decided it may legitimately punish. Some of these are:
words of conspiracy; libel and defamation; copyright violation; words
of threat; misleading advertising; disrespectful words uttered to a
judge, police officer, or other authority figure; obscenity; and words
A.

96. See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Implicit Racial
Attitudes of Death Penalty Lawyers, 53 DEPAuL L. REV. 1539, 1542-56 (2004),
reprinted in CITIcAL RACE REALISM: INTERSECTIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY, RACE, AND
LAw 33, 33-44 (Gregory S. Parks et al. eds., 2008) (discussing implications of
the IAT for understanding and controlling racism in society).
97. See sources cited supra note 96; Siri Carpenter, Buried Prejudice: The
Bigot in Your Brain, SCI. AM. MIND, May 1, 2008, available at
http://www.sciam.com/article.cfm?id=buried-prejudice-the-bigot-in-your-brain
(discussing the influential role of subconscious attitudes and predispositions
toward people of other races).
98. See supra Part II (discussing the harms of hate speech and the faulty
analysis of these harms by courts and some commentators).
99. See Delgado & Yun, Toughlove, supra note 22, at 1812-14 (noting that
some opponents of regulation believe that shrugging off incidents of hate speech
is preferable to attempting to control or punish them).
100. See supra Part II.B (noting that some victims of hate speech, such as
children, may be especially vulnerable).
101. That is to say, they may fear that their speech will contravene antihate-speech rules and remain silent for that reason.
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that create a risk of imminent violence. °2
If speech is not a seamless web, the issue is whether the case for
prohibiting hate speech is as compelling as that underlying existing
exceptions. First Amendment defenders often assert that coining a
new exception raises the specter of additional ones, culminating,
potentially, in official censorship and Big Brother."3 But our
tolerance for a wide array of special doctrines suggests that this fear
may be exaggerated and that a case-by-case approach may be quite
feasible. How important is it to protect a black undergraduate
walking home late at night from the campus library?'
As
important as a truthful label on a can of dog food or safeguarding
the dignity of a minor state official?' 5 Neither free-speech advocates
nor courts have addressed matters like these, but a rational
approach to the issue of hate-speech regulation suggests that they
should.' 6
B.

Incessancy and Compounding
Two final aspects of hate speech are incessancy-the tendency
to recur repeatedly in the life of a victim-and compounding.' 7 A
victim of a racist or similar insult is likely to have heard it more
than once. In this respect, a racial epithet differs from an insult
such as "You damn idiot driver" or "Watch where you're going, you
klutz" that the listener is apt to hear only occasionally. Like water
dripping on stone, racist speech impinges on one who has heard
similar remarks many times before. 18 Each episode builds on the
last, reopening a wound likely still to be raw.
The legal system, in a number of settings, recognizes the harm
of an act known to inflict a cumulative harm. Ranging from eggshell
plaintiffs to the physician who fails to secure fully informed consent,
102. See, e.g.,

DELGADO

& STEFANCIC,

MUST WE DEFEND

NAZIS?, supra note

22, at 43-44, 88, 102-03 (listing categories of unprotected speech).
103. This is the view of ACLU activist and Village Voice writer Nat Hentoff,
among others. See, e.g., NAT HENTOFF, FREE SPEECH FOR ME-BUT NOT FOR
THEE: How THE AMERICAN LEFT AND RIGHT RELENTLESSLY CENSOR EACH OTHER
(1992). Big Brother is the name for an omniscient governmental figure who
monitors every action and thought in GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY-FOUR
(1949).
104. Imagine such a youth who is set upon by three toughs yelling racial
epithets and suggesting that she go back to Africa because the university is not
a place for her.
105. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (listing untruthful
advertising and disrespectful words addressed to an authority figure as among
First Amendment exceptions).
106. Reflection on the panoply of current exceptions suggests that society
could coin another, either by analogy to an existing one, or by locating the new
one in a region carved out by underlying policies, such as respect for the
integrity of the human personality.
107. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 22, at
66-69 (discussing this recursive phenomenon).
108. Id. at 67; Delgado, Legal Realist View, supra note 21, at 788.
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we commonly judge the blameworthiness of an action in light of the
victim's vulnerability. ' 9
When free-speech absolutists trivialize the injury of hate speech
as simple offense, they ignore how it targets the victim because of a
condition he or she cannot change and that is part of the victim's
very identity. Hate speakers "pile on," injuring in a way in which
the victim has been injured several times before. The would-be hate
speaker forced to keep his thoughts to himself suffers no comparable
harm.
A comparison of the harms to the speaker and the victim of hate
speech, then, suggests that a regime of unregulated hate speech is
costly, both individually and socially. Yet, even if the harms on both
sides were similar, one of the parties is more disadvantaged than
the other, so that Rawls's difference principle suggests that, as a
moral matter, we break the tie in the victim's favor.'10 Moreover, the
magnitude of error can easily be greater, even in First Amendment
terms, on the side of nonregulation. Hate speech warps the dialogic
community by depriving its victims of credibility. Who would listen
to one who appears, in a thousand scripts, cartoons, stories, and
narratives as a buffoon, lazy desperado, or wanton criminal?
Because one consequence of hate speech is to diminish the status of
one group vis-A-vis all the rest, it deprives the singled-out group of
credibility and an audience, a result surely at odds with the
underlying rationales of a system of free expression."
IV. SHIFTING THE DEBATE FROM SUBSTANCE TO PROCEDURE

If hate speech offers little of social value yet taxes society with
very real costs, why should we not straightforwardly regulate it?
The balance of costs and benefits would seem to favor regulation,
while constitutional doctrine is indecisive-both sides cite plausible
cases, social policies, and history favoring their interpretation.
One side in the debate is prone to avoid difficult issues like
these by shifting ground and converting the debate into one about
procedure. In this respect, their approach recalls certain religious
fundamentalists who insist that the public schools teach creationism
as well as evolution because both, after all, are mere theories, and
109. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 43 (W. Page Keeton et
al. eds., 5th ed. 1984) (discussing eggshell plaintiffs and ones with similar preexisting vulnerabilities).
110. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 52-93 (rev. ed. 1999) (setting out a
moral principle according to which social rules should promote utility but only
insofar as this does not disadvantage those who are already severely
disadvantaged).
111. See DELGADO & STEFANCIC, MUST WE DEFEND NAZIS?, supra note 22, at
67-68; Delgado, Legal Realist View, supra note 21, at 786-87. One well-known
rationale of a system of free expression is the dialogic ideal-the notion that
protecting free speech is vital to the exchange of ideas necessary in a
democracy.
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the state should remain neutral as between competing explanations
of life's origin."' Many matters that once were accepted, these
writers point out, are now known to be false, and vice versa, even in
the supposedly objective arena of science."' Banishing free thought
about racial matters similarly risks freezing a discussion that ought
to be robust and wide ranging."'
But of course no respectable scientist believes that God created
the world in seven days 4,000 years ago or that life-forms like those
evident in the fossil record do not evolve over eons. Teaching young
students that creationism and evolution are equally plausible would
be a serious mistake.
What of hate speech? Could it ever turn out to be "true?""5
Ponder how much hate speech, particularly the face-to-face
variety,16 is not so much an invitation to a dialogue as a slap in the7
face-a performative expression, rather than a statement of fact."
"You dirty N-, you don't belong on this campus; go back to Africa"
conveys little that the addressee does not know. She certainly
knows she is an African American and that some members of the
local community wish she were not there. What, then, could she
learn from the exchange?
General hate speech, such as speech to a crowd or the ranting of
a bigot preaching the biological superiority of the white race, stands
on a different footing. Unlike targeted epithets, it is not a slap in
the face. Although antidemocratic and in contravention of our
deepest values, it aims to operate through persuasion. Here alone
the free-speech argument acquires a thin veneer of plausibility. As
unlikely as it is that the supremacist's language will one day become
the new orthodoxy, this is at least conceivable."" Hence, campus
112. E.g., Deborah Solomon, The Convert: Questions for Bobby Jindal, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 31, 2008, (Magazine), at 11 ("I think these decisions need to be
made by local school boards. In terms of teaching my own kids at home, I do

believe there is a Creator. Catholicism doesn't teach authoritatively on
evolution of the origins of life, but we do believe that God is our Creator.").
113. See, e.g., The Case Against Sarah Palin,NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 24, 2008,
at 1 (quoting Sarah Palin during October 25, 2006, Alaskan gubernatorial
debate: "[D]on't be afraid of information and let kids debate both sides.").
114.

See, e.g., THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF

SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS

(1962) (demonstrating how scientific theories and frameworks often change over
time); Delgado & Stefancic, Pornographyand Harm to Women, supra note 22, at

1052-54 (on the role of conventional frameworks in confining social change).
115. For discussion of a similar changing-the-subject argument, see Marcus,
supra note 15, at 1026 (noting that certain litigators are beginning to invoke the
First Amendment as a defense to lawsuits alleging sexual harassment or antiSemitism).
116. See supra notes 61-65 and accompanying text (defining direct or

specific hate speech).
117.

Performative means an utterance that, like "I do" (spoken at a wedding)

or "you're on" (culminating a process of contracting), effects a change in social or
legal relations by virtue of its very utterance.
118. Conceivable, but quite unlikely-just as it is conceivable (but quite
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authorities probably could not prohibit this form of hate speech,
although they could, and should, regulate its time, place, and
manner and make plain that the speech receives no official
endorsement but stands on its own insecure footing.
CONCLUSION

We have reviewed some of the main features of the debate over
the regulation of hate speech and added four observations that are
relatively new and go beyond our existing corpus. Two of these
concern the structure of the debate, while two others have to do with
the calculus by which the two sides assess each other's positions. In
particular, we have pointed out how the debate proceeds between
two camps of the progressive left at a time when conservative forces
have been making inroads into both civil rights and civil liberties.
We urge both camps, the defenders of the minority position and the
proponents of free-speech absolutism, to resolve their argument and
direct their energies toward their common adversary, the political
right. We also noted how the free-speech side often uses a
particular rhetorical ploy that consists of shifting the argument for
their position from substance to procedure.
With respect to the debate itself, we pointed out that the
calculus of harms has been incomplete. In particular, many scholars
have failed to differentiate the harms of the many varieties of hate
speech, take note of the special case of children, ponder the
importance of social power and setting, and recognize the connection
between general, nontargeted hate speech and the rise of destructive
social movements. We also noted that courts and commentators
need to take note of compounding and incessancy-the way hate
speech often targets an individual who, by reason of his or her race
or physical appearance, has been the object of similar attacks many
times before.
The debate about hate speech has been long and contentious in
part because it requires us to examine two of our deepest valuesequality and free speech-in a setting in which they are in tension
with each other. We will probably never fully solve this problem.
But we can at least appreciate its complexity and understand the
role the controversy, like hate speech itself, plays in society.

unlikely) that whites will turn out to be inferior to Asians in innate
mathematical ability or possess a gene for warlike behavior.

